Crisis of Governance

IBN Live : Blog :Bimal Jalan : February 13, 2012 

I have chosen this topic for discussion as I believe that, as we look deeper and wider in the functioning of our polity, we have to recognise that we are at cross roads. Unless we tackle some of the emerging problems, the process of national integration, which is a hallmark of India's democratic heritage, may itself be at stake. Already 170 districts in India (out of 560), according to official sources, are ungovernable. Some years ago, the Prime Minister himself referred to this as the "single biggest internal security challenge faced by our country".

On the prevailing crisis of governance, let me emphasise that what makes the present situation much more alarming than during earlier decades is that it is no longer "episodic", that is, confined to some outrageous event now and then. Over time, it has become "systemic" and spreads across practically all segments of the society, including governments at center and states, public institutions, corporate sector, sections of the media, and so on. There is widespread deterioration in administrative and public accountability, prevalence of corruption, income disparities among various sections of the people, rising power of criminals in politics, and the emergence of small parties as primary factors in determining the survival of multiple-party coalitions in power.

Let me mention a few core and pragmatic issues relating to emerging crisis of governance in the administrative and political system, and suggest some measures to improve the working of our government. Many of the recent developments in the working of the vital institutions of the state were not visualized at the time of the framing of our Constitution. Some of these have substantially reduced the responsibility and accountability of multi-party governments for what they do, or for that matter, what they do not do.

A fundamental "systemic" change, which dominates the working of India's politics today - unlike the first four decades after Independence - is the emergence of coalitions as a "regular" form of government since 1989. India has had as many as 9 governments during past 21 years - with an average life of less than two and a half years. Of these, 3 multi-party coalitions survived their 5-year terms with occasional set backs and shifts in the composition of parties supporting them from inside or outside. Excluding these three and the present government in office, the average term of five governments with enormous powers to allocate resources, control public enterprises and decide inter-state allocation of investments - was less than one year.

The crucial point here is that at the time of formation of a multi-party coalition government, general expectation of small and regional parties is that enormous powers that their nominees, as ministers, enjoy may not last very long - or that it may change if a more powerful leader of one or two large parties in coalition so decides.

Under the present Constitutional provisions, as a consequence of amendments carried out in 1985 and again in 2003 to prevent defections, now there is also a built-in incentive for fragmentation of political parties at the time of election. This is because smaller a party, the greater the power of an individual legislator to defect to another party in search of political power without having to relinquish his or her seat in Parliament or State Assembly. On the other hand, a member elected from a large national party has very little discretion to defect without the support of a substantial number of other members, who also wish to defect. Thus, the smaller a party the easier it is for a few of its members or all of them to switch from one coalition to another, and maximize their political capital.

Unfortunately, over the past two decades in particular, politics has also become a career of choice by persons with criminal records. The investigative and prosecution machinery for suspected criminal activities is under direct control of departments of the government. There is a natural reluctance to speed up investigations and the prosecution of persons who are leaders of political parties and/or members of the cabinet. According to the statistical survey of elections to the Lok Sabha in recent elections, it has been found that nearly 20 per cent of the candidates surveyed, cutting across party line (excluding independent candidates) had criminal antecedents. In the present Lok Sabha which has 543 seats in all, well over 100 members had criminal cases pending against them.

Recently, there has been widespread public outrage about corrupt ministers at the Centre and states about scams relating to allocations of public resources, such as, land, mines and gas. Some ministers have also been sent to jail by the Supreme Court and High Courts because of involvement in bribery and other illicit practices. To see our so-called Hon'ble ministers in jail is a sad commentary about the functioning of India's democracy. But let us also ask ourselves - how is it that these Hon'ble ministers had the opportunity and such enormous discretionary powers to accept massive bribes from corrupt corporates? Who gave them this opportunity? Was it the intention of our Constitution to confer such powers on elected representatives of the people?

If we wish to tackle the spread of corruption and ineffectiveness of proper governance by government in India, it is necessary to introduce some political reforms to reduce corruption, power of small parties to destabilize multi-party coalitions, and attractiveness of politics as a career for persons with criminal antecedents. I have dealt with these and other political issues which require urgent attention in some detail elsewhere (please see my new book "Emerging India: Economics, Politics and Reforms" which has just been published by Penguin, cover page of which is attached). Let me just mention three urgent political reforms which require to be undertaken as early as possible.

First, the anti-defection law should be made applicable to small parties and independent members who choose to join the government. In other words, those who join the government cannot defect (as has happened in several states of India in past few years) without having to seek re-election. At present, as mentioned above, there is a built-in incentive for fragmentation of political parties at the time of elections as the anti-defection law applies only to members of a particular political party irrespective of their numbers in Parliament or Legislatures.

Second, highest priority should be given by Courts to hearing cases of elected leaders with criminal antecedents. Their cases should be mandatorily decided within six months after their election. Such a procedure would effectively "reverse" the incentive for criminals to choose politics in order to delay investigation of their cases and possible conviction. In fact, they may choose not to contest elections so that they are in a position to delay hearings through normal legal procedures!

Finally, in view of the high cost of periodic elections, governance can not be improved without reducing the compulsion of political parties to raise funds through illicit means. This is one of the primary causes of political corruption. State funding of elections is urgently required to help those - however few they may be - who wish to remain in politics without having to indulge in corrupt practices. The budgetary costs of funding elections by the state are unlikely to exceed 0.3 to 0.4 per cent of the total annual budget expenditure.

There is a great deal to be done in all these areas. In conclusion, let me just add that notwithstanding our past performance, I am sanguine about India's economic potential and our ability to achieve high growth with financial stability. The reason for this confidence is that, despite problems in governance, the innate ability of our people is immense and has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt. The open, participative and democratic system ensures that a change, where necessary can be delayed, but it cannot be avoided altogether.