Monday, March 10, 2014

Is Sahara India’s Swiss Bank?

Is Sahara India’s Swiss Bank?
On 4 March, the apex court sent Roy to judicial custody in Tihar Jail for a week after he failed to spell out a detailed plan for refunding investors who bought bonds of two group companies. Photo: Abhijit Bhatlekar/Mint
Livemint  Tamal Bandyopadhyay 10 Mar14
The Supreme Court on Friday rejected the Sahara group’s proposal to repay money to its bond investors, and directed it to submit a fresh plan by 11 March. It extended the custody of Subrata Roy, chairman of Sahara India Pariwar, a largely unlisted business conglomerate with 4,799 establishments in its fold and at least Rs.1.52 trillion in assets, including 36,631 acres of land, until he presents a revised plan to refund money to 29.6 million investors. The Sahara group submitted a proposal to repay Rs.2,500 crore in three days and the balance amount in phases every three months.
On 4 March, the apex court sent Roy to judicial custody in Tihar Jail for a week after he failed to spell out a detailed plan for refunding investors who bought bonds of two group companies—Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd andSahara Housing Investment Corp. Ltd (SHICL)—under a scheme that market regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi) ruled illegal. Sahara offered bank guarantees for Rs.22,500 crore to Sebi and proposed to help verify information about investors by deputing “hundreds of competent workers” to assist the regulator.
Six years ago, when the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had shut Sahara India Financial Corp., the group’s non-banking finance arm, with at least Rs.17,500 crore in deposits, the repayment process was smooth for an investor base bigger than the current one—some 39.4 million people. Interestingly, the cluster of Sahara’s investors is the same. Sahara claims that those who had kept deposits with the non-banking arm also subscribed to its bonds and this is why the group considers them as “associates”, while justifying their investment in the so-called private placement of bonds, but the Supreme Court suspects there is no genuine investor.
After a brief courtroom drama, first in Allahabad high court and later at Supreme Court, in June 2008, RBI had directed Sahara not to accept any new deposit that matures beyond 30 June 2011, and stop accepting instalments of existing deposits also with effect from that date. The company was directed to repay the deposits as and when they mature and bring its liability to zero before 30 June 2015. Sahara also replaced the company’s auditor and reconstituted its board. H.N. Sinor, former managing director of ICICI Bank Ltd; T.N. Manoharan, a chartered accountant and founding partner of Manohar Chowdhry and Associates; and Arvind K.D. Jadhav, a 1970 batch Indian Administrative Service officer, and former mining secretary and chairman of Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority, joined its board as independent directors.
The RBI forced all these changes on Sahara because of its continuing alleged violations of investment norms. The banking regulator had accused Sahara of not following rules regarding the payment of the prescribed minimum rate of interest to depositors, asset-liability management guidelines, the so-called know your customer (KYC) norms for opening deposits, and failing to intimate depositors when their deposits matured.
The primary job of the directors was to ensure that the depositors’ interest was protected by smooth repayment through sale of government bonds and securities. Sahara was forced to sell some assets to generate liquidity but that was not enough to pay depositors. By 2010, Sahara got a Rs.1,800 crore refund from the income tax authorities, which it had paid under protest. The money offered it a huge cushion against redemption. By the time Sinor and Manoharan left the board in October 2011 (Jadhav had left much earlier), Sahara’s deposit liability came down to about Rs.2,000 crore and its net-owned funds rose Rs.3,000 crore. By December 2013, only Rs.768 crore was left to be paid. Indeed, the directors were concerned about unclaimed deposits (as on 31 March 2011, there were 93,43,776 depositors who hadn’t submitted their claims for Rs.952.86 crore), but they did not come across a single instance of KYC violation.
The repayment to 29.6 million bond investors, in contrast, has been complex and fraught with controversies right from the beginning. In November 2010, Sebi banned the Sahara group from raising money from the public in any form and, in June 2011, the regulator asked it to pay back investors with 15% interest. In October 2011, the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT), the appellate body, upheld the market regulator’s order and directed the two Sahara firms to refund Rs.24,029 crore within six weeks. This was eventually endorsed by Supreme Court judges K.S. Radhakrishnan and Jagdish Singh Khehar in August 2012, who asked the group to furnish details of investors who had received the money and Sebi was to validate such claims. Sahara has all along claimed that Sebi has nothing to do with the group’s money-raising activity through the so-called optionally fully convertible bonds, which was done under the watchful eyes of the ministry of corporate affairs and with the express sanction by the registrar of companies in different Indian states.
Reluctantly, Sahara first sent truckloads of documents to Sebi as proof of its payments to millions of investors, then deposited Rs.5,120 crore with the regulator, and finally claimed to have paid all investors in cash using the money raised by other group firms but still it has not been able to satisfy the Supreme Court, which wants to see the money.
There are two key differences between the two payment settlements. First, the depositors were paid over years while the bondholders repayment is envisaged within a short span of time. Secondly, Sahara itself paid the depositors under the supervision of its independent directors while Sebi has been entrusted with the task of paying the bond holders. Sahara claims Sebi has not made any serious effort to identify depositors with the help of the group and pay them their dues while Sebi’s contention is that the letters sent to thousands of investors have either not been delivered or not responded to.
At this juncture, one feels tempted to ask many questions. Since the Supreme Court suspects the investors in bonds are fictitious, has Sahara changed its business model? Were the investors in deposits genuine and in bonds fake? Is Sahara the Swiss Bank of India where the high and mighty keep their unaccounted money and millions of investors have only lent their names? Only a thorough probe by the investigative agencies can answer these questions.
While being sent to Tihar Jail, a highly emotional Roy said this is his reward for expanding financial services and reaching out to the masses and his patriotism. Those whose hearts bleed for Roy and his group are saying that by transferring the money to the Consolidated Fund of India, the nation is using the group’s resources to bridge the fiscal deficit. While these are conjectures, nobody will deny the fact that the latest developments have dealt a blow to Sahara’s business model, eroded its brand built over decades through its association with cricket, Bollywood and corporate social responsibility activities and the group is possibly left with no choice but to firesale its assets in India and overseas to get out of the situation that it has found itself in—the gravest in its 36-year history.
Sahara has filed a defamation suit in the Calcutta high court against Tamal Bandyopadhyay and obtained a stay against his forthcoming book Sahara: The Untold Story that he has written in his personal capacity.
Sahara has filed a defamation case in a Patna court against Mint’s editor and some reporters over the newspaper’s coverage of the company’s dispute with Sebi. Mint is contesting the case.
Tamal Bandyopadhyay keeps a close eye on everything banking from his perch as Mint’s deputy managing editor in Mumbai. He is also the author of A Bank for the Buck, a book on HDFC Bank.

Nokia X launched in India for Rs 8,599: Will the price hurt Nokia?


#NOKIA X
Nokia X launched in India for Rs 8,599: Will the price hurt Nokia?
Will this price work in India?
By Shruti Dhapola  fp/  10 Mar 2014 , 14:46
Nokia’s Android smartphone, the Nokia X was launched in India today for a price of Rs 8,599. Nokia’s other two Android-based smartphones, the Nokia X+ and Nokia XL will launch in India in the second quarter. But the big question is whether the Rs 8,599 price tag really worth it? We take a look at the pros and cons of Nokia’s pricing.

The Pros 
Brand value: It is at the end of the day a Nokia device and the company still offers some of the best after-sales service for phones in India and are known for their long-lasting products. If you want a low-priced Android but with good after-sales service, a Nokia X could be your best option now. It might not have the highest spec’d camera and is in the same price range as devices from Micromax, Lava or Karbonn, but Nokia will offer good after-sales service and customer support, which is crucial when you’re buying a low-budget smartphone.

Battery: Nokia has been known for creating devices where battery life is a non-issue. The Nokia X is said to offer up to 10.5 hours of talk time on a 3G connection and up to 22 days in standby time. On 2G, the battery is rated for up to 13.3 hours of talk time and up to 28.5 days of standby time. In the same price range you are unlikely to get similar battery life. For instance, Micromax Canvas Doodle A111 has a rated battery life of 6.5 hours and is priced around Rs 7999. Karbonn Titanium S5 Plus which is priced at Rs 9400 is rated for only up to 4 hours of talk time. So if you don’t care about snazzy features such as an HD camera, and want a solid phone with good battery life, the Nokia X is a great option now.

Android and Nokia are finally together… sort of: Nokia X runs a forked version of Android. What this means is that the smartphone runs Android without giving users access to the Google Play Store. However Nokia has promised that users will be able to run almost all Android apps on the Nokia X. A range of third-party apps come pre-installed, including BBM, Plants vs. Zombies 2, Viber, Vine and Twitter. Users can download apps from the Nokia Store, third-party app stores and sideload them as well.

If you’ve longed to go back to Nokia but are an Android fan, this is the only chance you’ll get. Also a rooted version of the Nokia X was also spotted online ensuring that users who want their traditional Google apps from the Play Store such as Gmail, Google Maps, etc do have an option of getting them. Nokia is not too happyabout that development, but it’s good news for users. The only downside to this is that once you root your phone your warranty goes for a toss.

The Cons
Low-end specs: In a world, where quad-core smartphones  are available for under Rs 10,000, the Nokia X does seem highly priced for a device with an aging dual-core processor, 512 MB RAM and only 4 GB storage. The Snapdragon S4 SoC with the CPU clocked at 1GHz is unlikely to impress users who have become used to faster and more modern processors for a similar price. Add to that the fact that there is no front camera and the rear camera is only a 3-megapixel unit.

Android and Windows marriage: Given that rooting the phone will impact warranty, not everyone is likely to try it out. To this crowd, the Android and Windows marriage might not be as appealing as pure Android (We mean Android as it’s used by most other manufacturers). This version of the smartphone doesn’t come with Gmail, Google Maps, etc but with Outlook and Here Maps, which would mean those moving from Android phones will have a higher learning curve and might not be able to get all their existing apps on the Nokia X. While Nokia has promised that users will be able to run most Android apps, the fact that there’s no official Google Store will not appeal to those who have become used to it even in low-end phones. Not everyone knows how to sideload apps, even though it’s very easy, and unless Nokia brings the major new apps quickly to the X, it’ll be a repeat of the Windows Phone problem.

Competition is cheap: When it comes to Android smartphones, Indian buyers are too spoilt for choice, with many options going for cheaper than the Nokia X and offer a bigger screen or a better camera. The list of quad-core smartphones that start under Rs 10,000 is fairly long in India. Add to that the Indian market has shown a preference for smartphone with bigger screens and 5-inch catgeory has done tremendously well in the country. Perhaps Nokia should have launched the Nokia XL first.

Is the price right?
As far as pricing goes, the Nokia X seems to be on the higher side, and even with the strong brand recall and after sales-support network, Nokia might have a hard time in the market. Just have a look at some of the responses we got on Twitter when talking about the price of the phone.

By tech2 News Staff /  10 Mar 2014 , 14:45
Nokia has launched its first Android device for India at an event in Mumbai. TheNokia X will be available from today for Rs 8,599. That price is slightly higher than the Rs 8,500 tag it was expected to sport, and could be the major factor in the final equation, Nokia is positioning the X series below its Lumia line, but above the Asha range, so it is expected to bridge the gap between the two price points. It must be noted that the price announced is the MOP (Market Operative Price) of the phone, so the box price (or MRP) is higher.

While the Nokia X has been launched, the company didn’t launch the X+ or the XL in India. Both are expected to launch in the next couple of months. The Nokia X run Android, but the login and app data is tied to Microsoft’s cloud services, and not Google as in any other Android phone. The phones run a version of Android Open Source Project, with access to sideloading of apps, third-party app stores and Nokia’s own store. You will find Microsoft essentials instead of Google services. Indian buyers will not get free Skype calls to mobiles and landlines when they purchase the Nokia X, due to regulatory hurdles.

The Nokia X features a 4-inch display with a 800×480 pixel resolution. It sports a low-powered Snapdragon S4 SoC with dual-core processor, which given the other specs should be enough for most use cases. The dual-core processor is clocked at 1GHz. There’s 512MB of RAM on the Nokia X, and it has 4GB internal storage and the ability to take in microSD cards up to 32GB in capacity.

The Finnish company has decided to go with a 3-megapixel primary shooter, and there’s no front-facing camera. That’s a bit of a disappointment for the selfie-obssessed and Skype users, though you can still use Skype on the phone. The Nokia X gets a 1500 mAh battery, rated for around 13 hours of talk time on 2G and 17 days standby time. In terms of connectivity, the X and X+ have dual SIM slots, 3G cellular data, Wi-Fi b/g/n and Bluetooth 3.0.

Who is responsible for the crisis at UBI?

United Bank of India

 B S :Manojit Saha & Somasroy Chakraborty  |  Mumbai/ Kolkata   4,Mar 14


Lax credit appraisal and rivalry at the top may have caused
 the rise in bad assets, but the episode raises larger
 questions on the role of leaders in PSU banks


At a time when the demand for bank finance is weak, interest rates are high 
and the economy is growing at its slowest pace in a decade, not many 
lenders are willing to expand their credit portfolios aggressively. But there
 are exceptions, and Kolkata-based United Bank of India (UBI) is one of them.
 Thus, UBI's advances increased 34.2 per cent to Rs 83,636 crore at 
the end of September 2013 from a year earlier. This was almost double 
the industry average during the period. Even on a sequential basis, the 
bank's advances increased 17 per cent.

UBI is certainly not the only bank in the country to report unbridled growth

 in its loans. Bank of Maharashtra, for instance, increased advances 
36 per cent in 2012-13 (April-March) when loan growth in the banking
 sector was only 15 per cent. But, given UBI's weak finances, mounting
 losses, deteriorating credit quality and low capital adequacy ratio, many 
now blame the unrestrained growth for the  in the bank. The bank's
 loss more than doubled to Rs 1,238 crore in October-December 2013. 
UBI's gross non-performing asset at the end of December stood at 
Rs 8,546 crore, or 10.82 per cent of all assets, which is much higher 
than the public sector banks' average of 4.1 per cent, as on 31 March 2013. 
While UBI's share in overall gross advances is about 1 per cent, its share
 in non-performing assets is as high as almost 3.5 per cent. Fresh slippages 
topped Rs 3,000 crore in the December-ended quarter. The Reserve Bank
 of India (RBI) recently conducted an audit to examine the factors 
contributing to the rise in its non-performing assets and capped the
 loan sanctioning power of the bank to Rs 10 crore, pending further 
instructions.


Too many things to blame

From faulty software to political pressure - everything is being held
 responsible for the present state of UBI. Claims are also being made
 that because of a rift between its senior executives, UBI probably 
overstated its non-performing assets to the extent of Rs 2,000 crore
 in farm loans and cash credit accounts. Industry analysts and experts
 feel aggressive credit expansion in an uncertain macroeconomic 
environment added to the bank's problems. "I have learnt a very 
simple lesson in banking: if you are attempting to build assets at a pace
 much above the industry, then the quality does suffer. This one is no
 exception," Ashvin Parekh, managing partner of Ashvin Parekh Advisory 
Services LLP and a senior expert advisor on financial services at 
Ernst & Young in India, says.

Public sector bank chairmen are often accused of window dressing
 their accounts at the end of a financial year in order to inflate the size 
of their book. Every year, without fail, loan growth gathers pace towards
 the end of the fourth quarter, while bulk deposit rates rise as lenders
 scramble for funds. Analysts say sometimes banks in their exuberance 
to grow fast relax their credit appraisal processes a tad, which later comes
 back to haunt them. UBI, for instance, has seen several small loan accounts
 (of below Rs 10 lakh) turning non-performing - which points towards a
 lax credit appraisal system.

A few bankers, however, believe that the problem is deep-rooted and blame
 the government's appointment process for top executives in public sector
 bank. It is often seen that a state-run bank's fortune fluctuates and earnings
 dwindle immediately after it gets a new chief. The common perception is that 
the outgoing boss prefers to leave on a high note and often under-reports 
non-performing assets, leaving the task of cleaning up the mess to his successor.

The appointment of the chairman in a public sector bank involves the 
formation of a search committee, which is headed by the RBI governor.
 In practice, the governor usually delegates the responsibility of overseeing 
the appointment to his nominee (mostly the deputy governor in charge of 
banking development and operations). A representative from the finance 
ministry is also there on the search panel. The eligibility criteria for chairmen 
or executive directors are relaxed every now and then. According to rules,
 to become eligible for the post of chairman in a public sector bank, a
 candidate needs to have at least two years of residual service and must
 have worked as an executive director for at least one year.
But, in the last few years, there have been instances of candidates becoming chairman with less than two years of residual service. In one particular case, a chairman was appointed for only nine months. "This system fails to build a strong 
leadership structure in public sector banks," says a senior banker. Archana
 Bhargava, who became the chairperson and managing director of UBI in 
April 2013, opted to resign within 10 months of taking charge. The official
 reason cited was ill-health, even though talks of mismanagement and her 
growing rift with senior executives were getting louder. The government is
 yet to name a new chairman and has put the two executive directors - 
Sanjay Arya and Deepak Narang - in charge of the bank till further announcements.

"Several factors have played a part in monitoring the quality of the loan 

book, or the lack of it, at UBI. The board members as well as the officers at
 the grassroots have to take responsibility for the quality of the assets. 
Leadership plays a very important role and the top management should
 take responsibility, particularly in the areas of decision making and not
 disclosing the risks sitting on the book," Parekh says.

While the boards of all public sector banks have representatives from RBI 

and the government, it is the chairmen or their deputies who are blamed
 for all the bad loans. This, bankers explain, is because of a near-dormant
 role played by the board members (other than the chairmen and executive
 directors) in key decisions. RBI has been advocating the withdrawal of its
 nominee from boards of public sector banks - a decision which the 
government is not keen to implement any time soon.

Too late to turn the tide?

While it is clear that there is a problem with UBI, the question is,

 can the crisis turn into a systemic problem? If not, then why is
 the central bank suggesting superseding the entire bank's board?
 According to senior finance ministry officials, because an RBI nominee
 also sits on the board, a more proactive response is expected from the
 regulator. They also suggest, now that the worst seems to be over, 
what UBI needs is a new chief executive, and in a year, the bank will be 
back on track if some discipline regarding loan sanctioning and asset quality
 is maintained. "It (UBI's problems) should not have happened. As a matter
 of fact, we are engaged with RBI, checking to see why such a thing has
 happened. RBI has to react quickly to these problems. It has a nominee
 director who should have been wide awake," Rajiv Takru, secretary 
(financial services) in the ministry of finance, told Business Standard in
 a recent conversation.

Another senior official at the finance ministry suggests that one way of 

solving this problem is to do away with direct government holding in public
 sector banks. He adds that a quasi-government agency should own the
 majority of shares in public sector banks and cites the ownership pattern
 in Axis Bank as an example. The country's third-largest private bank is 
owned by SUUTI, or Specified Undertaking of Unit Trust of India, in which
 the government has a majority stake. The arrangement has allowed the
 board of Axis Bank to appoint key officials like chief executive and executive
 director who are in control of the day-to-day business. The chairman of 
the bank, which is a non-executive role, is appointed by the government.

BANKING LIKE A SHARK

To corporate trainers, who take inspiration from the animal world to

 describe leadership style, United Bank of India's former chairperson, 
Archana Bhargava, will probably come across as a shark - someone 
who forces others to accept her way, wanting to win at any cost and
 to be in control at all times. As an executive director of Canara Bank, 
Bhargava did not see eye to eye with many of her senior colleagues. 
A former co-worker remembers her as someone who disagreed with
 colleagues - be it loan sanctioning or asset classification. Once, apparently, 
she refused to sign the bank's financial statement as she was not 
convinced with the treatment of non-performing assets.

A post-graduate gold medalist from Miranda House, University

 of Delhi, who started her career as a management trainee in Punjab 
National Bank, Bhargava did not make much effort to change that
perception when she took charge of UBI on April 23, 2013. Talk of 
the growing rift between her and other top management executives
 started within months, and became louder and louder in recent months. 
She quickly earned the reputation of a "tough boss" who would not
 take no for an answer. General managers were often found waiting 
in a queue outside her office for their turn to brief her.


Indian banking - Reform by death


Arvind Subramanian
























 B S :Arvind Subramanian  March 7, 2014 

Since the government cannot privatise public sector banks, 
the central bank should force it to let the bad ones fail


The past is never dead. It's not even past," noted the American novelist
 William Faulkner. Arguably, the two most egregious economic policy 
mistakes of the past that continue to haunt India were the licensing of 
Indian industry during the Nehru years and the nationalisation of private
 banks byIndira Gandhi in 1969. These actions had one common disastrous 
feature: penalising and expropriating the Indianprivate sector.

 Other policies that turned out to have adverse consequences were 
different in principle. They at least purported to help the private sector
 (such as the imposition of trade barriers to protect industry from
 foreign competition) or fill in for it (such as the creation of the public sector).

Restrictive industrial licensing policies have been almost completely reversed, 
although their consequences still linger (most notably in the weak
 performance of Indian manufacturing). But bank nationalisation
 endures as a millstone around the Indian economy, a grim reminder
 and legacy of Indira Gandhi's policies.

Undoing this legacy may well turn out to be one of the most critical tasks 
for the Reserve Bank of India's (RBI's) current governor, Raghuram Rajan.
 The problem is so intractable and so embedded in Indian politics that 
only he can, and can afford to, take on the challenge.

On the face of it, that task has begun. The RBI will soon be awarding new 
banking licences to allow for a greater role for private sector banks. 
But this may not be enough. Consider why.

Since , an overarching principle for eliminating inefficiency in
 vast parts of the economy has been this: to promote competition
 via private sector entry rather than change ownership throughprivatisation.
 This approach had some intrinsic merit - after all, Russia went from
 communism to gangsterism because it sold public assets cheaply 
to a few oligarchs.

More importantly, the entry-favouring approach had the virtue of political 
expediency. Privatising public sector companies would have encountered 
significant opposition from their managers as well as from strong unions. 
Allowing private sector companies to enter the market without touching
 the public sector incumbents bypassed some of these costs and allowed 
reform to proceed by stealth. The logic and hope, of course, were that a 
vibrant private sector would grow rapidly while the public sector would 
shrink, at least in relative terms.

And the strategy broadly worked. Yes, Air India is still a mess and a public
 burden, but the Indian aviation and telecommunication sectors of today
 are mercifully - and unrecognisably - different from what they were 
20 years ago, with enormous benefits for the Indian economy. Public 
sector companies now account for a small share of the overall size of
 these sectors.

This entry-favouring strategy was tried in banking too. Since the early 
1990s, a number of new banking licences were given to the private sector -
 think of ICICI, HDFC, Axis Bank, Kotak Mahindra, Yes Bank, and so on. 
Yet, the share of public sector banks in total banking (measured as a 
share of assets or deposits) has stubbornly persisted around 75 per cent. 
And the reason is simple. The private banks have grown, but the public 
sector banks have grown too because India's politicians have used them 
as a way to channel money to private sector operators - often very
 influential ones. The credit boom of the 2000s, which is now manifesting
 itself in rising non-performing loans, emanated mostly in the public sector. 
Vijay Mallya did not borrow from private banks; he was enabled into 
borrowing from, and undermining, the public ones. So, going forward
 the fact of more private banks is no guarantee of reducing the role of 
public sector banks.

This will be especially true if the new banks are encumbered with regulations 
such as priority sector lending, which restricts their ability to grow. So, as 
new banking licences are awarded, the aim should be to tilt the playing field 
as much as possible against the public sector incumbents in whose favour 
the playing field is already hugely tilted by way of unlimited financial support
 from the public exchequer.

One possibility relates to foreign banks. It is true that the world over - and
 especially in the United States - regulators are forcing foreign banks to 
create subsidiaries in host countries so that they will have more capital to
 cushion against crises. But in India the benefits of subsidiarisation must 
be weighed against the costs of deterring foreign bank entry, which might
 have other benefits such as being able to effectively compete and
 out-compete public sector banks.

What can be done more directly to reduce the role of public sector banks? 
Because such banks are important levers of political control and influence,
and because bank unions remain powerful, explicit privatisation seems off 
the table. But there is an indirect way of privatising them, or at least
 beginning the process of privatisation, which the RBI should seize. And
 the opportunities could present themselves soon.

As growth declines and exposes the fragility of some of the public bank
s in the form of rising non-performing loans, the RBI should be brutal in
 its assessment of them, erring on the side of declaring some banks as 
unviable commercial institutions. The government will want to bail out 
the failing banks through fresh capital infusions.

But here is where the RBI should stand firm, urging the government to
 let them go, on the grounds that a fragile economy can afford neither
 the fiscal costs of bailouts nor the efficiency costs of bad banks continuing 
to be prolonged on life support. The worse the economy, the more the 
bargaining chips Dr Rajan will have. And he should use them to resolve
 the bad public banks, in part by transferring their good parts to the 
private sector.

This strategy may sound difficult to implement. Indeed, it will be. But it is
 the only way forward. The past two decades have taught us that private
 banks cannot really grow unless and until public sector banks are shrunk. 
That shrinking may have to be achieved by allowing the bad public sector 
banks to fail because politics will never allow good public sector banks to 
be privatised. It was famously said that in science progress is made one 
funeral at a time. Unfortunately, that may be the only realistic way of
 reforming Indian banking too.


Amex's elusive black card now in Indian pockets




 B S  :Somasroy Chakraborty  |  Kolkata  March 9, 2014 
There is a one-time joining fee of Rs 2.5 lakh and 
the annual fee is Rs 2 lakh

It’s the ultimate credit card — one that American Express(Amex) has 
been grandiosely describing as “rarely seen but always recognised”. 
Very rich Indians are finally going beyond just seeing and recognising
 Amex’s fabled black card— they are getting to keep the card in their
 pockets as well.

According to sources, a few hundred have been issued to Indian
 businessmen, celebrities and brand experts. Amex is tight-lipped 
and declined to give out any names but Business Standard has 
access to a copy of the invitation sent by Amex to its Indian clients.

The black card is not something anybody can aspire to hold because 
it is issued only by invitation. Sources say there is a one-time joining 
fee of Rs 2.5 lakh and the annual fee is Rs 2 lakh. Amex did not disclose
 the eligibility criteria but it is widely believed annual income, spending 
habits and credit rating are the key determinants.

Sources also say an individual will probably need to use Amex’s platinum
 card for at least a few years before getting an invitation for the black card.

The black card is made of titanium (one of the most precious metals) 
and weighs about 12g or about three times more than standard plastic cards.

There is no spending limit, which means a cardholder can practically
 buy anything just by swiping it. But it is also a charge card. In other
 words, the cardholder has to fully repay the balance every month and 
cannot roll over the dues.

Amex, it is learnt, does not list in detail the facilities offered through a
 dedicated concierge because these are vast. According to media reports,
 the concierge service has even gathered sand from the Dead Sea and 
had it couriered to London for a child’s school project on the Holy Land.

So, if you have the black card, don’t hesitate to request Amex to arrange
 for the exclusive box in a sold-out concert. And, don’t be surprised if you
 also get an invitation to attend the sound check, meeting the band at the
 backstage or even rehearse a duet with the lead singer.

The known benefits, as mentioned in the invitation letter, include airline 
and hotel upgrades and access to almost any airport lounge across the
 globe. In addition, a cardholder is also offered medical insurance (sometimes
 up to Rs 2 crore) and is given cover (up to Rs 5 lakh) for tangible 
goods bought with the card against loss or damage.

However, the real benefit is probably the 24-hour concierge service that 
ensures the cardholder can get almost anything anywhere — securing 
tickets of sporting events to shopping to reminding birthdays and
 anniversaries. The service also helps cardholders find limited edition 
collector’s items.